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COMMAND AT BUNKER HILL.

Thirty-two years since, though without any pretensions to
be an author, we consented to write an account of Bunker
Hill Battle, as a feeble contribution to the monument of fame
that history owed our ancestors. But, we find, one may be
be an author in spite of himself; we have been compelled to
address the public repeatedly in defence of our history,
though never before with so great reluctance. By this time
we hoped to enjoy the privilege of age, to exempt us from
this task; and, notwithstanding our friendly regards for
Mr. Frothingham, and a high appreciation of his book for
its intentional honor and honesty and successful research, we
shall be obliged to notice at least one of his mistakes. For
he is under the same ban as all our race : “ to err is human.”
And were his mistake solitary, it would compensate for that
by its magnitude, nay, its sublimity. According to him, the
great Battle of Bunker Hill was fought, on our side, by a
headless mob; and, to prove this, he adduces the most incon
trovertible argument in the world, were it true, — that the
army at Cambridge, which had been for two months collect
ing and organizing under the able and experienced Gen.
Ward, assisted by a host of accomplished veteran officers,
was itself a mob. He terms it, by a new-invented name,
“ an army of allies; ” a misnomer, calculated to mislead
Ins readers in regard to its organization. On the files of the
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Provincial Congress, and by the Committee of Safety, it is
termed the New England army ; and, in the gazettes of the
day, the American army. Gen. Putnam, he says, would
have been the commander in the battle, had the army been
“ regularly organized ; ” but, because “ it had not yielded to
the vital principle of subordination,” he was present as a
patriotic volunteer. He has treated Gen. Putnam’s charac
ter with the utmost candor and kindness, as animals destined
for the altar are pampered, to be sacrificed at last.
It will be our duty to enter into a thorough investigation
of this subject of the command, though with great repug
nance, on account of its involving the rival claims of Putnam
and Prescott. For both those heroes we entertain the most
devoted admiration, and the deepest interest in their fame.
Could we have imagined that any such discordant claims
might be advanced, our history had never been commenced.
In our numerous conversations with Judge Prescott on the
subject, we never discovered their existence until our history
was published. He had presented to the Athenaeum Gen.
Heath’s Memoirs, as a declaration, we presumed, that the
statements in them relative to his father were correct; and to
Heath’s opinions we subscribed. We have contented our
selves heretofore with a simple statement of the facts that
were known relative to the command ; but an historian is
bound to state the principles, as well as the facts, relative to
the characters he introduces, and the legitimate conclusions
resulting from those facts and principles, as much as a coun
sellor is bound to do so for his client.
The author, in robbing Putnam of the command, “not
enriches” Prescott, nor any one else. He does not intimate
the possibility that Prescott may have been the commander
of the battle: so far from it,, he emphatically denies that he
issued any order whatsoever on Bunker Hill, or at the rail
fence ; and slates that he was one of the junior colonels in
the army, that Col. Frye was an older officer and in the
battle ; whilst he does not pretend that Prescott exercised, or
had a right to exercise, any command over him, or over
other colonels who were in the battle, and older officers than
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himself. He attributes to Prescott nothing more than a
colonel’s command over his detachment, which, by some un
accountable mistake, he computes at twelve hundred, whilst
it is limited at one thousand by Col. Prescott himself, and
all reliable authorities. He states that Prescott held councils
of war; but he ought to have added, that this was not at
any time whilst Gen. Putnam was in Charlestown; and that
they were confined to the junior officers of his detachment.
He confines him during the battle to the redoubt; and he
might have added that it was impossible for him to have
exercised any command through the line, because he was on
foot; though he does add one fact which is exceedingly im
portant,— that Prescott had but one hundred and fifty men
left under his command at the redoubt,
*
during the battle, as
is stated by the colonel himself, and others who were with
him ; and, in conclusion, he observes, that Prescott was left
in the redoubt, during the battle, without the slightest inter
ference, control, or command from Gen. Putnam or any one
else. Now, there never was, and never will be, any one to
question or deny one tittle of these statements relative to
Prescott; we subscribe to them implicitly.
But the author has labored, throughout a large portion of
his book, to prove the most insignificant abstraction that ever
entered visionary’s imagination, — that Gen. Putnam pos
sessed no right to command Col. Prescott. Grant it; and it
would not add one leaf to the laurels of Prescott, nor a
single ray to the splendor of his fame. Nor, on the other
hand, would Putnam lose by the concession. Grant to
Putnam the command of all the rest of the battle, and all
that is thus demanded for Prescott would constitute so insig
nificant an exception, as merely to illustrate the proverb, that
the general rule is proved by the exception.
Mr. Frotbingham says nothing of any command at the
breastwork, though, by describing it as reaching down to the
slough, he has represented it as longer than it was, and has
marred and obscured by this mistake one of the principal
• The regular number to line the front of the redoubt would be 132.
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features of the battle. The breastwork did not reach down
to the slough by six or seven rods; which space was nearly
or quite unprotected, as was the farther space of 190 yards
between the breastwork and rail-fence, except by the slough,
that did not reach back to the rail-fence by-80 yards. Now,
this was the weak point and key to the American position,
which the enemy were grossly culpable for not discovering,
through their previous reconnoissances and knowledge of the
ground. We did not discover, till we had written thus far,
that the author had our own authority for his mistake, or
rather our printer’s. In our map of the battle, we have
represented the fact correctly ; but in our text it stands, that
the breastwork ran “ to” instead of “ toward ” the slough.
Taking for granted all the author says of Prescott, we
should pass over the authorities he has accumulated concern
ing him, were it not that, left unexplained as they are by him,
they may mislead his readers into the belief, that Prescott
had command, not only of his detachment, but of the battle.
We will go through the list. The report of the Committee
of Safety says, “ The commander of the party gave orders to
retreat from the redoubt; ” and one of the writers of the
the report is supposed to have called Prescott 11 the com
mander of the provincials.” That is, Prescott commanded
the party, the provincials, who raised the redoubt, and those
of them who fought there under him, till he gave them orders
to retreat. The author denies that he commanded any
others : “ Gen. Ward, in his letter to President Adams, 30lh
Oct. ’75, says that Bunker Hill Battle was conducted by a
Massachusetts officer.” Ward was endeavoring to make
out a strong case for the Massachusetts against the Southern
officers. As he knew it was physically impossible for Pres
cott to have conducted the, battle, because he was on foot,
and militarily so, because there were generals and other
officers older than Prescott on the field, he must have
intended to designate himself or Warren as the conductor of
the battle. Possibly he intended to claim the honor himself.
The first syllable of the word 11 conducted ” has been altered
by the pen : he began perhaps to write the word “ com

manded; ” but, recollecting that he could not claim the
command, altered it into “ conducted.” And he was
authorized to claim to have been the conductor of the battle,
and to have conducted it with great skill and discretion.
Air. Frothingham thinks, that, “ in a military point of view,
it would be difficult to assign a just motive to either party
for this conflict." We place in our Appendix the declaration
of the proscribed patriot Adams on the subject, which will
justify Gen. Ward, and satisfy every one on this point.
But, notwithstanding Gen. Ward’s use of the word “ conducted,” he probably intended to say that Warren was the
conductor or commander of Bunker Hill Battle, knowing
that he was on the field, vested with all the rights and
authority of a major-general; — which was literally true,
notwithstanding Frothingham’s mistake in supposing that
Warren told Prescott, as a reason for not assuming the command, that he had not received his commission. This is a
mistake of fact and law: Warren, according to Gen. Heath,
said not one word about his commission, and his want of one
did not diminish his rights of office; a point that has been
settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. It
was not so extraordinary for Ward to call Warren the com
mander, as for Gen. Humphreys to do so in his life of
Putnam, whose Aid he had been. Both, doubtless, were
ignorant of the fact, that Warren refused to exercise any
command on the occasion. It was not generally known till
published by Gen. Heath, twenty years after the battle.
Martin the chaplain, who was present the night before and
during the battle, says, “ The Americans took possession of
the hill under Prescott.” This is taken by Frothingham
from Stiles’s Diary ; and the reason why Stiles does not
quote Martin as saying they were under Putnam likewise is,
doubtless, because he had just before entered the same fact
in his diary from the all-sufficient authority of Gen. Green.
Martin says, that he urged Prescott in vain to send for Put
nam and a reinforcement; that Prescott and he differed, even
to quarrel, about the reinforcements ; and that he ordered one
of the men oil himself to Gen. W ard, which brought Gen.
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Putnam and a large reinforcement about noon. “ Gordon
says one thousand men under Prescott intrenched ; Gen. Put
nam is busily engaged in aiding and encouraging here and
there as the case requires.” 11 Dr. Thatcher says, Prescott
headed the detachment, and retained the command,” that is,
the command of it. Frothingham says this is unequivocal
in favor of Prescott. Instead of that, Thatcher is une
quivocal in favor of Putnam’s command, by placing him
at the head of all the officers, in the following words: —
“ Generals Putnam, Warren, Pomeroy, and Col. Prescott
were emphatically the heroes of the day.” “ Pitts says, it
appears to me there never was more confusion and less
command; no one seemed to have any but Col. Prescott.”
“ Gen. Heath says, Prescott was the proper commanding
officer in the redoubt.” And Heath says, and Frothing
ham in another place quotes it as an instance of a collision
between Putnam and Prescott, that Putnam rode up to
the redoubt, and told Col. Prescott that the intrenching
tools must be sent off; and that Col. Prescott, though he
remonstrated against it, obeyed the order. Gen. Lee, in his
memoirs of the war in the Southern States, has what is called
an obiter dictum, a few words foreign to his subject, in which
he remarks that Gen. Howe found his enemy posted on
Breed’s Hill, 11 commanded by Col. Prescott.” The author
gives no explanation of Lee’s words, nor does he claim that
they mean any thing more than Prescott’s command of his
detachment and the redoubt on Breed’s Hill. Lee quotes
no authority, and was no authority himself. He knew
nothing about the battle. His ignorance was so gross, that
he says the Americans had no artillery. Lee states, how
ever, that Prescott received no promotion in the army of the
United Colonies. It is impossible, then, that he could have
been the commander of the battle. Judge Tudor throws no
light on the subject: he says, “There was no authorized
commander ; Col. Prescott appeared to have been the chief; ”
“ the whole business appeared to have been conducted with
out order, or regular command.” Our author adds the
words of Col. Prescott’s son: “ Neither Gen. Putnam nor
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any other officer ever exercised or claimed any authority or
command over Col. Prescott, or the detachment, before or
in the battle.” It follows not that they had no right to do
so. The author attributes to Col. Scammans an anonymous
note in a newspaper, written perhaps by the editor, saying,
“ As there was no general officer who commanded on
Bunker Hill, was it not Whitcomb’s duty to have been
there ? ” This probably meant early in the day when Scam
mans met Whitcomb, and Putnam was not on the hill. But
the author omits to mention here, that in the same paper it
appears from witnesses under oath, and not denied, that
Scammans, during the battle, sent to Gen. Putnam, at
Bunker Hill, to see if he was wanted, and that his regiment
went to the top of Bunker Hill; “ after which Gen. Putnam
came up, and ordered the regiment to advance within hearing
of Col. Scammans.”* We have gone through Mr. Frothingham’s list of authorities; and in the whole of them there is
not the shadow of an excuse for his conclusion, “ that no
general officer was authorized to command over Prescott
during the battle.” But, if these authorities were trumpettongued in support of his conclusion, it would remain one
of those things which no evidence can prove. The author is
dealing with hard characters: Ward, Warren, Putnam, and
Prescott, are not rag babies, that an historian may bend and
distort according to his fancy. The whole kingdom of Great
Britain could not bend one of them. Yet, if this story be
true, Ward, a stickler for the authority and dignity of officers
according to their rank, imposed on Warren and Putnam the
insulting restriction of fighting the battle, shorn of half their
authority and command ; and these high-spirited and gallant
heroes submitted to so ignominious a condition. Still worse ;
• The author's mode of stating evidence, by this extract of a note out
of a whole trial, equals the clergyman who fulminated the following text
against the Haunting top-knots our foremothers wore on their heads: —
“ Top-knot, come down,” leaving out the other words of “ Let him on the
house-top not come down.” Colman, in his “ Broad Grins,” describes a very
large man as three single gentlemen rolled into one : our author has contrived
to roll up most of Scammans's officers, who testify in his case, into a single
witness. Page 164.
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they no sooner arrive on the field than they deny their own
agreement. Warren, in a shuffling answer to Prescott,
implies his right to the command, and makes a merit of fore
going it in favor of so distinguished a veteran ; while Putnam
not only disavows his agreement, but has the atrocious folly
to attempt to bully such an officer as Prescott out of his com
mand, who obeys him, however, without daring to assert his
rights. This is certainly very strange history; but, unless
every word of it is true, the author’s conclusion must be
false. The author has taken no notice of Gen. Dearborn’s
declaration of Col. Prescott’s conversation with him on this
subject. Dearborn states expressly, that he was informed by
Prescott that he sent to Putnam to come forward and exer
cise the command, as he could not do so for want of rank ;
confessing thus that Putnam, while on the field, was fully
entitled to be the commander. All the world knows that he
did come forward and exercise the command most effec
tually, from the beginning to the end of the engagement.
There may be some unwilling to believe that the opinion
of Mr. Frothingham is entitled to no weight; but he, as well
as myself, are writing on a subject technical and professional,
belonging to the art of war, concerning which both of us
confess we know little or nothing. He seems unable to dis
tinguish between a separate and an independent command.
Were he writing on chemistry, he might perhaps exclaim, of
a well-known fact, as he does about Putnam and Prescott,
“ It is impossible that two white things put together should
make a black one ; ” or in astronomy, that it is quite impos
sible the earth should have any movement of its own, while
it was under control of Jupiter and the Sun.
We have made the supposition of the author’s fundamental
error being solitary; but errors, like misfortunes, never come
alone. The lost traveller, who wanders from the right road,
enters on a boundless field of aberration, and at every step
plunges deeper into a chaos of mistakes.
To prove that Putnam was not the commander, the author
alleges that, in some cases, he was not obeyed as such.
Now, we say with the utmost confidence, that, any few cases
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of cowardice out of the question, no military despot ever
was obeyed with more implicit subjection than Putnam was,
throughout the battle, by every one, officers or men, from
their enthusiastic love and admiration of him, and boundless
confidence in him, as a great, experienced, and fortunate
hero and patriot.
The first case he imagines to have been an instance of dis
obedience is that of Col. Sargent, whom he charges with
disobeying Gen. Putnam’s order for him to go on to Bunker
*
Hill.
This injustice to the reputations of Putnam and Sar
gent arises from the most inconceivable misconstruction of
Col. Sargent’s letter to us, the only document on the subject.
Col. Paul Dudley Sargent refuse to go on to Bunker Hill, or
any other battle-ground ! He was one of the greatest fire
eaters of the revolutionary army. Gen. Washington ob
served, that, in all his councils of war, whenever he proposed
any measure which his other officers thought too desperate to
be undertaken, Sargent always voted for its execution.f
Had the author ever heard of the man, or made the slightest
inquiry among his relatives in Boston, he would never have
imagined the possibility of such an imputation. Had Put
nam ordered him on to Sinai’s hill, with all its fires, he would
not have hesitated, had there been fighting there.
Whilst Col. Sargent was at Cambridge, his regiment, and
that of Connecticut, were stationed under the immediate
command of Putnam at Inman’s farm, the most exposed and
important post of the army, near which place the enemy had
landed at the time of Lexington Battle. During the Battle
of Bunker Hill, both these regiments were like “greyhounds
on the slip,” earnestly entreating of Gen. Ward lor permis
sion to join in the conflict. But, apprehending the enemy
would land at the same place again to assail him, he would
not grant them permission, until it was too late for Col. Sar
gent to participate in the battle. When he arrived at
Charlestown, the battle was over ; our troops had retreated ;
and Sargent found Putnam, with all he could rally, on top
• Page 168. Note 1.

t Hun. Daniel Sargent.
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of Prospect Hill, where, in hot haste, he was throwing up
intrenchments, often laying some of the sods himself to
encourage his men. The day after the battle, he observed
that for three days he had neither washed nor changed his
clothes. But, though the battle was over, Sargent could not
deny himself the satisfaction of scenting the British Lion.
He lingered under the enemy’s cannonade till every one of
his men had run away, and he himself was wounded, when
he returned to Cambridge. Putnam, in defiance of Ward’s
orders, who, notwithstanding his urgency, had always re
fused him permission, was fortifying Prospect Hill, and sent
repeatedly for Sargent to join him, which he declined ; but
why he does not intimate. He might have exposed himself
to a court-martial by a compliance. These are all the facts
the author has for the assertion, that Sargent disobeyed Put
nam’s order to go on to Bunker Hill. It is simply and
palpably impossible that any such order should have been
given or disobeyed. (For more of Sargent, see Appendix.)
The only other instance in the author’s book of Putnam’s
being disobeyed, to make good his allegation that such cases
existed, is that of Capt. Callender of the Artillery. If any
thing could be more wonderful than the author’s mistak
ing one hill for another, when both have been before his
eyes from his birth, it would be his adducing this case as one
of disobedience, or a case of any kind to disprove that Put
nam was the commander. And it is quite as extraordinary
that he should refer to a newspaper for the facts in Callen
der’s case, when he had before him a complete statement of
them in the report of a committee to the Massachusetts Con
gress ; a report from which he has extracted only five words,
saying that Putnam ordered Callender to go back, though it
is so important in a description of the battle, and especially
for the fame of Gen. Putnam, that any historian who
neglects it commits a most unfortunate mistake. This committee say, “ We applied to Gen. Putnam and other officers,
who were in the heat of the engagement, for further intelligence. Gen. Putnam informed us, that, in the late action,
as he was riding up Bunker Hill, he met an officer in the
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train, drawing his cannon down in great haste; he ordered
the officer to stop and go back ; he replied, he had no
cartridges; the general dismounted, and examined his
boxes, and found a considerable number of cartridges, upon
which he ordered him back; he refused until the general
threatened him with immediate death ; upon which he
returned up the hill again, but soon deserted his post, and
left the cannon.” Now, this is the strongest case imaginable,
not of disobedience, but compulsory obedience. Callender
obeyed Putnam to the letter, as the committee say; he
deserted his post afterwards. And we ask the author
whether this conduct of Putnam was that of a volunteer.
But allow the author to make his own case regardless of
*
facts.
Suppose Callender disobeyed Putnam, and that it
was for this he was condemned, instead of cowardice only,
as he was, this imaginary case would be worse than the real
one for the author and his argument; it would give us the
sentence of the court-martial to prove that Putnam was his
commander. As if purposely to declare he did not think
any thing relative to Putnam deserving of ordinary care or
attention, he says, “ This report states Callender was riding
down the hill,” when there is not a syllable of the kind.
The author has racked his fancy to discover other objections
to Putnam’s having the command, that are as groundless as
the foregoing. He objects, that, if Putnam had been the
commander, he would have boasted of it in his letter to the
town of Cambridge, in which he claims the merit of having
saved that place from the incursion,of the enemy, after the
battle, by erecting fortifications on Prospect Hill. In the first
place, the argument proves too much : it would prove that he
was not the commander in the battle at Chelsea; for he does
not mention that in his letter; and he had more reason to
• The author’s declaration, that Callender was tried for disobedience,
27th June, seems to be a poetic license. Ward orders the court-martial at
that time, without the slightest intimation of such a charge. Fearing our
readers’ incredulity, we have omitted hitherto another of our author’s mis
takes : he sometimes, like St. Patrick, carries liis head under his arm, instead
of wearing it on his shoulders.
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boast of that, than of Bunker Hill Battle, to the people of
Cambridge, who would have thanked him for nothing in
regard to the latter. It was he who, with Prescott, had
urged on that battle for the good of the country, but at the
imminent risk of Cambridge, and brought on them the very
danger to which he alluded. But he had a better reason for
not mentioning either of those battles. He was not a brag
gadocio. The author’s next objection is, that Putnam did
not at the time publicly claim to have been the commander.
Putnam claim the honor of the command, when all the world
at that time agreed in attributing it to the martyred Warren I
“ Putnam’s generosity was singular; ” “ he was generous
almost to a fault.” Was he the man to pluck from the
bloody brow of Warren the crown of honor, for the nominal
command of Bunker Hill Battle ? — from Warren, whom he
adored as a patriot, and loved as a friend and brother; who
had just stood by his side at the cannon’s mouth at Chelsea
and Bunker Hill ? In the bosom of his family, he declared
the bare idea was abhorrent to him. In that sanctuary,
however, he did not hesitate to declare that he was the com
mander.
The author represents President Stiles as stating, in his
Diary, 20th June, as one among various rumors from camp,
that Gen. Putnam took possession of the hill the night before
the battle; and that Stiles, on 23d June, after receiving ad
ditional information from those who had seen Gen. Putnam,
enters in his Diary “ that Putnam was not on the hill at the
beginning.” The author has no right to introduce the
second entry to contradict the first, because he knows that,
if it does so, it is false; for he has stated himself that Put
nam was present at the beginning of the intrenchment. For
the same reason he cannot adduce it to prove Putnam was
not present at the beginning of the battle. But there is no
contradiction between these entries: both of them are true.
President Stiles was not a man to contradict himself; his
meaning is perfectly clear ; he is speaking of the 17th June,
and says Putnam was not present at the beginning, that is,
the beginning of the contest by the enemy’s cannonade at
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daylight. But who would imagine, that, instead of any
rumors, as the author calls them, on which Stiles makes his
first entry, Stiles says not one syllable of any rumor ? So far
from it, he states expressly and distinctly that William
Ellery, the leading man of Rhode Island, and well-known
signer of the Declaration of Independence, had just shown him
a copy of a letter from Gen. Greene at Roxbury, second to
no one in the army except Washington, and a copy of
another letter from the Committee of Supplies [of R. Island
at Roxbury] ; and that Gen. Greene said, Gen. Putnam took
possession and intrenched on Bunker Hill, Friday night,
16th inst.; “ and that Gen. Ward said, the enemy’s loss was
three times as great as ours.” “ Greene,” Styles says,
“ seemed to doubt this at first; but, from after-inquiry, and
considering that Putnam fired from the trenches, and that it
was said the dead of the enemy covered an acre of ground,
Gen. Greene seemed rather to credit the estimate.” The
Chamber of Supplies says, “ The king’s troops attacked
Gen. Putnam, who defended himself with bravery, till over
powered and obliged to retreat.” Now, these accounts alone
settle the whole question of Putnam’s command for ever.
Instead of being base metal to be stigmatized as rumors,
they are sterling gold, and stamped at the highest mint in
America.
We have gone through the objections of the author to
Putnam’s claims, as we did through his positions in favor of
Prescott’s, and demonstrated them all to be groundless. We
repeat that we have done this with the greatest repugnance,
not only from our personal respect for the author, but
because we may be suspected of doing so from rivalry. But
the author will bear us witness, that we did all in our power
beforehand to render his history as perfect and correct as pos
sible, for the very purpose of avoiding the necessity of writing
again on the subject. Whence his invincible prepossession
against Putnam’s claims it is useless to inquire ; but he
acknowledges the assistance of a number of gentlemen, who,
as well as he and myself, belong to Massachusetts; and we
must all acknowledge our natural and instinctive preference
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and partiality in favor of an officer of our own Commonwealth.
This is fearful odds against Putnam; but, in his long warfare
for his country, he came off triumphant in many a desperate
conflict while living ; and his hard-earned reputation may
suffice to gain him one victory more, though he is dead. In
the fable of the lion painted by man, the lion complains that
man is the painter instead of himself. Putnam, the lion of
Connecticut, might well complain that we men of Massa
chusetts are drawing a picture of him in Bunker Hill Battle.
But happily for the moral of that fable, three other lions of
Connecticut, Stiles, Dwight, and Whitney, have done the
same; and their picture of him is much more life-like than
Frothinsffiam
’s.
o
We are delighted to discover, at last, something amusing
in one of the author’s mistakes, to relieve this dry and
dolorous discussion. He says, Putnam had the command of
a regiment, because he was complimented with the empty
title of colonel of a particular regiment, or rather the regi
ment was complimented by bearing the name of the nominal
colonel according to the etiquette and fashion of that day.
But this gave the nominal colonel no more right of command
over it, than my signing myself the author’s humble servant
gives him a right to call on me for menial service. The regi
ment, in these cases, had a full compliment of officers in
command, exclusive of the nominal colonel. The King of
Prussia paid the same compliment to the King of France, by
making him a colonel of one of his regiments ; and even the
Virgin Mary was appointed by Louis XI. the colonel of a
regiment.
We are at a loss to account for the author’s hallucination:
perhaps, being an antiquarian, he has adopted the odd notion
of our ancestors, that some men are born for perdition,
whose good deeds are filthy rags, and all efforts to save
them useless ; in fact, that Putnam was one of those cul
prits described in our common-law code as outlaws, who
wear wolves’ heads, “ caput hipinum” and whose brains it
is the duty of every one to beat out. He seems to imagine,
that the head of the wolf Putnam slew in the cavern may by
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some legerdemain have been transferred to his shoulders;
and it must be acknowledged there are some who appear
to be of that opinion.
Putnam was a large, strong, muscular man, with an open,
bold, determined countenance, and a large head, with full
broad forehead and brain, proclaiming prodigious power and
energy of mind to govern and direct, and passion to impel.
As a farmer-boy, born and brought up in Essex, Massachu
setts, one of the most enlightened counties in America, he
must have partaken of the universal cultivation around him,
though his schooling was confined to a few winter weeks
annually. Before the Revolution, he had been many years
in the army, in continual desperate battle on the continent
and in the West Indies, and fought his way up from captain
to a colonelcy. For particular accounts of him, we refer to
the biographies, eulogies, and histories that mention him.
Frothingham has given us the flattering eulogies on him by
Gen. Reed, than whom a more intelligent officer was not
under Washington. The late eminent scholar, John Picker
ing, sent us an eulogy upon him, from the English Annual
Register, which he thought was written by the great Edmund
Burke. Gen. Dearborn says, “ The universal popularity of
Putnam at the commencement of the Revolution was such as
can scarcely now be conceived, even by those who then felt
the whole force of it.” Gen. Burbeck says, “ He was the
great gun of the day.” President Dwight, and no one knew
him better, says he was “ a man whose generosity was sin
gular, whose honesty was proverbial; a hero who dared to
lead where any dared to follow.” But Washington has
stamped on Putnam the fiat of fame. The first moment he
met him on Prospect Hill, he paid him a flattering compli
ment, “ that he inspired every man under him with his own
energy and spirit; ” and he pronounced various eulogies
on him up to the moment of bidding him his last farewell.
Their mutual confidence and friendship were uninterrupted,
except for an instant, when Washington thought Putnam
was desirous of doing more than his share of the fighting.
Washington called for part of the troops of Putnam, who
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waited to entreat permission to head them first against New
York, as he had before against Boston. Washington, though
his military sternness was as gigantic as all his other good
qualities, rebuked him with more forbearance than he ever
exhibited on a similar occasion. He was more severe on
Hamilton for a slight want of punctuality, when he said to
him, “ A ou must change your watch, or I must change my
Aid.”*
But the appointment of Putnam as Brigadier-General by
Connecticut, and Major-General by the Federal Congress,
over the heads of many most respectable officers, would prove,
without any of these notices, that no other officer could
have been selected as the commander of the battle, as he had
been on three very conspicuous occasions before. If com
mander there was, he must have been the commander; and
“ that there was, all nature cries aloud.” Since the world
began, in all history or natural history, there never was a
battle known without a commander. It is the instinct of all
animated nature, insect, animal, or man; from the bee to the
buffalo, from the Indian savage to Gen. Taylor. Milton’s
battles of the angels were fought under Michael and Satan
as the commanders.
Our next incontrovertible proof that Putnam was the com
mander is founded on the fact, that the army at Cambridge
was regularly organized and consolidated under Ward,
Warren, Putnam, and other officers in regular gradation,
without any distinction in regard to the colonies whence the
troops came. The author acknowledges, if this was the fact,
that Putnam was the commander ; we take him at his word,
and will make this so clear, that he who runs may read.
The question is one of fact only, as regards both the army
and Gen. Putnam ; whether the army was, in fact, a consoli
dated and organized body, and whether Putnam was com
mander of the battle de facto. Whether all this was
technically legal and constitutional is a question as abstract
and useless as that other of the author’s, whether Putnam
* For an interesting description of Putnam, see Appendix.
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had any right to command Prescott; and more hopeless: it
is almost on a par with that of free agency, or the origin of
evil. It would be as preposterous to deny that Putnam was
the commander, even if the army was not a legal one, as for
British historians to have denied that Washington was the
commander in the battles he fought, because they said he
was not a lea:al commander, and Gen. Howe said he was no
General, only Mr. Ac.: though he found to his sorrow, that
Washington and Putnam both were generals, and out-generalled hirn, — Putnam at Bunker Hill, and Washington ever
afterwards. There is poor encouragement for any one to
enter into this question of the legality of the organization
of the army, W’hen Pres. Adams, sen. and Judge Tudor
failed under it so egregiously. They both jumped into this
quickset hedge, and the author shuts his eyes and follows
them. The result is, Pres. Adams doubts whether any one
was authorized to command the troops of all the colonies;
and whether any one, except the old militia Gen. Pomeroy,
a volunteer with no command over an individual in Cam
bridge, had a right to command the troops of Massachusetts.
Judge Tudor doubts with him. The author is positive that
the army was one of allies only, and Putnam a mere volun
teer. Putnam was no more a volunteer than the whole army
at Cambridge was a volunteer army, or than the govern
ments of the colonies who sent the troops there were
volunteer governments ; and they were in fact mere govern
ments de facto, without constitutions, or conventions to form
any. New Hampshire, rather the worst off in this respect, had
two separate governments, — the royal, under the very popu
lar and conciliatory Gov. Wentworth; and the rebel, under a
convention ; and both were in operation for a month after the
battle. But just as much legality and constitutionality as
there was in these governments, so much there was in the
consolidation and organization of the army under Gen.
Ward. The facts were perfectly well known to all three of
the colonies, and their tacit consent and approbation was as
binding on them as if it was expressed by their regular enact
ments enrolled and recorded.
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The author omits, in his extracts from Adams’s letter, far
the most interesting and important part of it, as it regards
the subject, and especially Putnam’s claims. Adams thinks
his objections to the legality of the army extend to it, and to
Washington, when he took command. Now, this fortunately
gives us the conclusive authority of Washington, to show
that all these legal subtleties are of no practical importance.
Adams doubts whether the army was sufficiently organized
to authorize Washington to try by courts-martial the delin
quents in the battle. But Washington did not hesitate a
moment to cut this Gordian knot. He brought Mansfield,
Gerrish, Scammans, and all other delinquents, before courtsmartial ; and made Gen. Greene, of Rhode Island, the presi
dent of them, as if for the express purpose of declaring his
opinion, that this colonial question did not affect in the
slightest degree the organization of the army, or the authority
and liabilities of the officers. Our author labors to make out
an argument against Putnam’s command, by showing that
there was more legality and intimacy in the connection of the
New Hampshire troops with the rest of the army, than in that
of the troops from Connecticut. So complete was the union
of the Connecticut troops with the rest of the army, that
Putnam could not obtain Ward’s permission to lake the Con
necticut regiment to Charlestown the niarht before the battle,
though he strenuously urged it. The most he could obtain
was two hundred of them; and they were placed under the
command of Prescott, who had likewise a company from
New Hampshire (Capt. Dow’s) under his command. Could
any thing be more conclusive as to the consolidation of the
army ? We have the pay-rolls of New Hampshire to prove,
that her troops were adopted and paid by her from the first
moment they went to Cambridge. On the side of Connec
ticut this union was not onfy expressed by the manner in
which their officers were detailed for duty by Ward ; but he
placed under the immediate command of Putnam, Patter
son’s Massachusetts and Sargent’s New Hampshire regi
ments, in addition to one from Connecticut, at Inman’s Farm,
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the most exposed and important outpost of the army.
*
And
the very important action was fought, and the victory
achieved, under the command of Putnam, the 27th of May, at
Chelsea. On the 13th May, all the troops at Cambridge
marched under the command of Putnam to Charlestown, and
defied the enemy under the very muzzles of their guns. Lieut.Col. Huntington ■writes to Gov. Trumbull from Cambridge,
27th April: “ Gen. Ward being at Roxbury, Gen. Putnam is
commander-in-chief at this place.” Now, how is it conceiv
able, that the author, after narrating these three striking cases
of Putnam’s command over all the troops, and after this
overwhelming evidence of the complete coalescence of these
troops, should a few days after, when Putnam appears again
with the army at Bunker Hill, turn to the right about face,
like lightning, and deny that he could possibly command,
because it was an army of allies ?
The organization of the army at Cambridge, just before
the battle, was as follows: Two full regiments, under Stark
and Reid, and another small one under Sargent, from New
Hampshire, and one full regiment from Connecticut under
Lieut.-Col. Storrs, immediately after the battle of Lexington,
about two months before that of Bunker Hill, came to Cam
bridge, and voluntarily united themselves with the army
under Major-Gen. Ward. All these troops previous to the
battle, as we stated in our history of it, in the very words,
we believe, of Gov. Brooks (Maj. Brooks, of Ward’s army),
were regularly organized and consolidated, and the routine
and operations of a regular army were performed by them
precisely as though they had been all of one province. The
following extracts from Gen. Ward’s orderly book will put
this beyond dispute: — April 22, he orders Col. Stark to
inarch to Chelsea with three hundred men. May 2, he
orders Maj. M‘Clary, of the same regiment, to keep a vigi
lant look-out as far as Winter Hill. June 6, Lieut.-Col.
Storrs is officer of the main guard. June 7, Maj. Durkee
officer of the picquet guard. Similar appointments of the
• Col. I'utnum’k Ix-tter.
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Connecticut troops are made repeatedly ; and, on the 12th of
June, Ward orders a court-martial with Col. Frye, president,
and other officers of Massachusetts, united with Coit and
Keyes, and Jos. Trumbull, judge advocate, all of Connecti
cut. Here, then, we have a demonstration, as clear as were
it mathematical, of the complete union and coalition of the
whole army, not only with their own consent, but with the
sanction and approbation of their several provinces, to whom
all this was known. But allow the gentleman, as in regard
to Callender, to manufacture his own case, grossly regard
less of all known facts. Allow that these New England pro
vinces, who had always lived like brothers under one general
government, should, when their object, danger, and enemy
were one, be so discordant and repulsive, that each provin
cial corps, even in battle, must be insulated, he would not
be one step nearer to his object. Is it possible he is
ignorant that allies, as he calls them, when in military detach
ments, must be under the command of the oldest allied
officer, who ranks the rest ? This is so perfectly settled, that
it would be burning daylight to prove it.
We have thus proved a second time, from the nature
of the army, and the rank of Putnam, according to the
author’s own acknowledgment, that Putnam was the com
mander of the battle. We now proceed to prove it a
third and fourth time, by his conduct in the battle, and the
evidence in the case. Our troops were well fed at Cam
bridge, through contributions from the New England towns,
who thought, with the old general, that men fought best
on full stomachs: but, after waiting two months, they grew
impatient for fighting; and Putnam’s whole soul was with
them. Notwithstanding Ward’s prudence, Putnam per
suaded him at last to grant him two thousand men to
meet the enemy. The heights of Charlestown were carefully
reconnoitred by Putnam, fascines and empty casks were pre
pared for intrenchments, and all the intrenching tools far
and near were collected; but enough only could be found
for one thousand men, and Prescott’s detachment was limited
to that number from necessity; but they were to be relieved
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in the morning by an equal number in their places. The
still more important preparation of gunpowder was anxiously
attempted, though nearly in vain. During the turmoil of the
day of battle, Putnam called on the Committee of Safety to
receipt for eighteen barrels of powder from Connecticut.
He went on to Breed’s Hill the night before the battle, and
assisted in laying out the intrenchments.
*
He likewise took
his small soldiers’ tent on to the ground, and Capt. Trevett
says it was erected. This shows a “ foregone conclusion,” that
he was to be indissolubly connected with the expedition, and
all its consequences. But, what was still more in the spirit
of the man, he prepared for himself a relay of horses for the
battle ; and nothing more difficult: even Col. Prescott could
not find one for Maj. Brooks to ride to Cambridge, though he
endeavored to press one from the artillery. Putnam was the
only officer mounted in the battle, unless Maj. Durkee was
part of the time, as one of the documents relates. Durkee
had been his intimate associate in the previous war, as he was
through that of the Revolution. By daylight on the morn
ing of the battle, Putnam sent to Gen. Ward for a horse,
and procured another himself; he seemed to consider this as
important as Richard did, when he exclaims, “ My kingdom
for a horse.” He went to Breed’s Hill the night before the
battle; and this he did under the express agreement with
Gen. Ward that he was to do so, and to have the direction
and superintendence of the whole expedition. For the
minute detail of Putnam’s conduct relative to the battle and
connection with it, we refer to our history and notes. The
well-known, honorable, and intelligent Col. Putnam, son of
the general, who observes he was with the army at the time
of the battle, and afterwards an officer under his father till
near the close of the war, and during his whole life frequently
conversed on the subject of the battle with his father and all
others, wrote a memoir, which he communicated to the Monu
* Frothingham says there was another anonymous general there. No
other army general was there; and, if a militia one was, though of no
importance, we should have heard of it, from some one oi the mass of wit
nesses who were present.
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ment Association. Putnam, he says, early urged Ward
to have the heights of Charlestown fortified, who, with War
ren, objected the want of powder and battering cannon.
Ward hoped for peace and reconciliation with the enemy,
and wished to continue on the defensive.. Putnam said we
should gain peace only by the sword, and he wished only
to draw out the enemy so as to meet them on equal
terms. He frequently reconnoitred the heights; and, just
before the battle, Ward agreed to put two thousand men
under him to form intrenchments and defend them. Gene
ral Putnam went with half this force to Breed’s Hill the
night of the 16th, repairing at dawn to Cambridge for
the other thousand to relieve the fatigue-party; but the
cannonade of the enemy called him instantly back. Gov.
Brooks went on to the ground with Gen. Putnam, and was
present whilst he assisted in laying out the works. Col.
Trumbull, with the army at the time, says the detachment
went under the command of Gen. Putnam and Col. Pres
cott. Judge Grosvenor, an officer of the army at the time,
and in the detachment, says “ Putnam was with them; and,
under his immediate superintendence, ground was broken
and the redoubt formed; and that he commanded the troops
engaged afterwards.” Pres. Stiles, of New Haven College,
recorded in his Diary, that Putnam took possession of Bunker
Hill the night of the 16th. Pres. Dwight, of the same col
lege, says Putnam was the commander of the battle. Rev.
Dr. Whitney, the pastor and most intimate friend of Gen.
Putnam, states explicitly Gen. Putnam’s own declaration to
him, that the detachment was at first put under his com
mand, and that with it he took possession of the hill, and
ordered the battle from the beginning to the end. il These
facts,” he says, “ Gen. Putnam himself gave me soon after
the battle, and also repeated them to me after his life [by
Humphreys] was printed.” This is in a note of Dr. Whit
ney to his funeral discourse on Gen. Putnam, 1790, and
repeated in his letter, 1818. Col. Putnam, in his letter to
me, confirms Dr. Whitney’s declarations as to his father’s
assertions. Frothingham thinks they may have mistaken the
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general’s meaning. Col. Putnam’s reasons for his accurate
recollections, we have given. Dr. Whitney says, “ Soon
after Bunker Hill Battle, I was at Cambridge some weeks
chaplain to Gen. Putnam’s regiment, resided in his family,
and had peculiarly favorable opportunities of learning, from
him and others, in detail, the things which took place in the
battle from its beginning to its end.” Dr. Aaron Dexter
says, from memoranda written at the time, that he was in
formed by the officers at Ward’s quarters the day after the
battle, that Putnam had command of all the troops that were
sent down over-night, and that might be ordered there the
next day. Col. Bancroft, the distinguished captain in the
redoubt, says he was at the laying-out of the works by Put
nam, and that the rail breastwork was formed and lined
under the direction of Putnam. John Boyle, Esq. of Bos
ton, who was aide-de-camp to Gov. Hancock, in the expedi
tion to Rhode Island, writes in his Diary, 16th June, 1775:
“ Gen. Putnam, with a detachment of about one thousand of
the American forces, went from Cambridge, and began an
intrenchment on an eminence below Bunker Hill.” Col.
Samuel Ward, of Rhode Island, then a captain in the army
at Roxbury, writes, 20th June : “ Putnam had a sore battle
on Saturday.” Ethan Clarke writes to Capt. Ward, “ We
hear that Putnam is defeated, and Dr. Warren slain.” The
most astonishing inadvertence of the author, though mere
inadvertence we believe, is his publishing two pages out of
Rivington’s Gazette of 3d August, 1775, and never hinting,
that in the same paper of 29th June, 1775, it is stated that
“ Putnam on the evening of the 16th inst. took possession of
Bunker Hill, and began an intrenchment; ” and this extract
from Rivington was mentioned in a publication of ours, which
he had among our documents. Josiah Cleveland’s* depo
sition says he was of Putnam’s regiment; went on the night
of the 16th, Putnam at their head, who with others directed
the works, and ordered the Connecticut and some Massachu
• Of Canterbury. AU the names we give are of the highest respecta
bility : from their residences any one may inquire.
4
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setts troops to make the breastwork at the rail-fence. Abner
*
Allen,
of the same regiment, in his deposition, says he went
on the night before the battle; Putnam was then and there
called general, and acted as such. Major Daniel Jackson,
16th June, 1775, then a sergeant in the artillery, entered in
his Diary, “ Gen. Putnam with the army went to intrench on
Bunker Hill.” Trevett, senior captain of the artillery, the
day of the battle, inquired officially of Maj. Gridley, then in
command of all the artillery at Cambridge, and whose father
was inferior to no one in the councils of war, “ Who had the
command of the troops ? ” and was informed by him, “ Gen.
Putnam.” “ Then there is nothing to fear,” he observed at
the time. He consequently applied to Putnam for orders,
and received them. We have mentioned Putnam’s com
mand over three regiments from different provinces; and that,
while “Gen. Ward was at Roxbury, Gen. Putnam was
commander-in-chief” at Cambridge. Gen. Dearborn,f who
was in the battle, represents Putnam as the authorized
commander. Our next witness is the Rev. Jos. Thaxter,
of Edgarton, who, in his letter A.D. 1818, says, “ On
the evening of the 16th June, Col. Prescott and Col.
Bridge, with their regiments, under the direction of Gen.
Putnam, took possession of Breed’s Hill, and threw up
a fort or intrenchment.” We have looked in vain into the
author’s book for the name of Thaxter, that most venerable
and interesting old man eloquent, and minister of the Most
High, who, at the time of the battle, was chaplain in the
army, and, while the battle raged, was wrestling with
the Lord in prayer for victory; and, in 1825, with head as
white and heart as unsullied as the driven snow, appeared
again on the battle-field at the jubilee, and laying of the
corner-stone for the monument, to bear up to the throne
of grace the thanks of the hundred thousand who were
present, for the very success that he had prayed for in ’75.
The author has devoted twenty-two pages to this jubilee and
* Of Killingley.
t His pamphlet generally, especially page 13.
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monument, without one syllable to spare for the patriotism,
eloquence, and unction of this most interesting relic of olden
time, or for the mention of any religious service whatsoever
on the occasion. He dwells on Webster’s eloquent address
to the sovereign people, without the slightest notice of any
address to the Sovereign of the universe. The neglect of
all religious service on the occasion will be considered, by
all those who give credit to the author’s history, as a serious
imputation on our national character.
All this perfectly decisive testimony of Putnam’s com
mand is fully confirmed by the whole of his conduct during
the day after he left Gen. Ward at dawn, who promised
to send on a reinforcement. The breastwork at the railfence was built under Putnam’s orders by the Connecticut
and a few Massachusetts troops, though Frolhingham does
not give him the credit of it. He acknowledges it was
built by Knowlton and the troops under him, and that
Judge Grosvenor says Gen. Putnam placed them there.
Adj.-Gen. Keyes, then lieutenant in Grosvenor’s company,
says the same. Col. Putnam’s memoir states that his father
placed them there, and ordered them to make the best pre
paration in their power for defence. Col. Bancroft and Mr.
Josiah Cleveland,
*
as mentioned before, and Messrs. Aaron
Smithf and William Low,} all of them present and in the
battle, say expressly Putnam built it; and Low adds, Putnam
took a rail on his shoulder, and ordered every man to do the
same and build the breastwork. Greater service than this
was never performed by Putnam for his country, nor greater
service by him or any one at Bunker Hill. There were inge
nuity, knowledge of position, and generalship in it, that have
secured for him immortal honor, and the warmest gratitude
of all his countrymen to the latest posterity. Without this
defence, the overwhelming force of the enemy would have
Hanked, surrounded, and vanquished our ill-equipped troops
instantly. There was scarcely a regiment, corps, or in
dividual of the army, that Putnam did not personally
• Of Canterbury and Oswego.

t Shrewsbury.

J Gloucester.
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command, direct, or encourage. The reinforcements not
arriving, he galloped back to Ward’s quarters to obtain
them. He ordered Doolittle’s regiment
*
to go on at nine
o’clock; ordered Stark’s regiment to the lines, and reserved
a part of it to intrench on Bunker Hill; led on Wood
bridge’s and Brewer’s regiments; ordered Gardner’s to
build intrenchments on Bunker Hill; he ordered the com
panies of Little’s regiment to their posts; and Ford’s
company of Bridge’s regiment he ordered to draw Callen
der’s deserted cannon to the line. Ford, though no
submissive man, obeyed with the greatest reluctance, his
company being infantry, and Putnam fired the pieces him
self; some of the soldiers exclaiming that he made a lane,
others a furrow, through the enemy. He beat, cut, and
thrust with his sword a number of the soldiers who were
backward and cowardly, broke his sword over a dastardly
officer of Gerrish’s regiment, and compelled Capt. Callen
der to do his duty by threatening him with instant death.
During the raging of the battle, frothing at the mouth from
his vociferations, and his horse covered with foam, he was
galloping from end to end of the line, encouraging, direct
ing, and commanding everybody. My townsman Bagley, who was fighting at the time at the breastwork, and
others, say, in their simple language, “ he had a very encou
raging look.” In the language of one of Shakspeare’s
characters, —
“ He outfaced the brow of bragging horror;
So that inferior men, who borrow their behavior
From the great, grew great by his example,
And put on the spirit of dauntless resolution.”

And we say the same of Prescott. When Putnam could
no longer prevent the retreat of his troops, he was one of the
last in the rear. He told Whittemore, an old companion of
the former war, he would rally again directly, as he attempted
to do at his slight intrenchments on Bunker Hill, where
* Letter of Capt. Holden, of Leicester.
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he obstinately remained till even the Leonidas company of
Charlestown, and Trevett’s noble corps, left him alone. But,
even then, Gen. Putnam it was who saved the honor of his
country, as he had already secured for her all the advantages
of victory in the battle, by rallying his troops again on Pros
pect Hill within cannon-shot of the enemy, who did not dare
to follow him; and he made a drawn battle of it.
Seventy-five years since, the Battle of Bunker Hill was
fought. Who the commander was has ever since remained
a mystery. Maj.-Gen. Ward was the commander-in-chief
of the army at Cambridge; Maj.-Gen. Warren, the next;
Brig.-Gen. Putnam, the third in command; and Col. Pres
cott, another officer of the army. Gen. Ward, from head
quarters, ordered the preparations for the battle, and the
general movements and disposition of the troops during the
day. But, from want of staff officers, he was unable to
ascertain or to direct the particular movements and manoeu
vres of the troops during the day. He was the commander
of the general movements out of the field. Had Napoleon,
with his numerous staff, been in Ward’s place, history, with
out hesitation, would have recorded him the commander.
*
Warren
was on the field, and, notwithstanding he declined
to issue any orders, was authorized so to do whenever he
pleased. His situation was nearly identical with that of the
admiral, who declined giving any orders to his fleet, and
merely directed that “ every commander of a ship should
kill his own bird.” Warren, then, was the authorized, and
for many years the supposed commander, as he was the dis
tinguished hero, martyr, and volunteer of the battle. Gen.
Putnam was the actual, and, on Warren’s declining, the
authorized commander of Bunker Hill Battle. He was “ the
bright particular star,” to which, during all the storm and
tempest of the battle, every eye was turned for guidance and
• Warren was at Ward's quarters ; and, on the British coming out, Ward
called him from his bed, as he promised to do, to go to Bunker Hill without
any known restriction.
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for victory. Col. Prescott
*
was commander at Bunker Hill
the night before the battle, and the next day till Gen. Putnam
came on with the reinforcements ; and, during the battle,
the commander at the redoubt. He erected his works with
his detachment of one thousand men, under a sheet of fire
from the enemy like a volcano, and defended them after
wards most heroically to the latest moment of desperation.
He immortalized his name. There were, then, four who in
some sense participated in the command of Bunker Hill
Battle; hence the multiplied mistakes on the subject. It
may be equally impossible to demonstrate who was exclu
sively the commander, as to discover the author of Junius,
or birthplace of Homer. It was our duty not the less to
make the attempt; as we have done with the greatest diffi
dence, considering it a forlorn hope.
* The author says, Judge Prescott’s understanding and belief was, that
the order to his father was in writing, — a very natural supposition for that
eminent lawyer; but Ward had no adjutant-general to make out orders.
His order to Col. Scammans on the 17th June was verbal: “ Go where the
fighting is.” And that to Prescott on the 16th was probably not more
formal, or in writing: it could be only, “ Go where the intrenching is.”
(See Appendix.)

APPENDIX.

Page 7.
Accobding to Hon. Jos. Allen, late of Worcester, Samuel
Adams, the proscribed patriot, said, “ I have heard some people
find fault with Gen. Ward, for intrenching on Breed’s Hill, so
near the enemy, without any fortifications in their rear; but the
world does not know how much that man is to be justified for so
doing; for he had secret intelligence from Boston, by means of
spies, that the British were about to take possession of Dorchester
Heights; and, to divert them from their object, a close approach to
the enemy was made by intrenching on Breed’s Hill, which had
the desired effect, until the provincials could take possession of
Dorchester Heights.”

Page 12.

Col. Sargent was born at Salem, in 1745, but resided in early
life at Cape Ann, and was rugged as the rocky mountains there.
From his continual intercourse, by sea, between the Cape and the
Capital, he acquired the additional roughness and hardihood of the
mariner, and was not mollified by his fierce disputes with the
government and tories in Boston. His schooling in the tented
field lent the last finish to his character: he was a perfect Iron
sides, and loved fighting as he loved his eyes. Learning from his
brother, who was a tory, that he was proscribed by Gov. Hutchin
son, he made his escape into New Hampshire, where he raised a
5

regiment, to repay the governor’s compliment, by assisting to
blockade Gov. Gage. When Washington departed for New York,
Sargent remained at Boston under Gen. Ward, who, Sargent says,
knowing his opinion of him, placed him as far off as he could, in
command of the castle and islands. Though the British had
been driven off, he contrived to find fighting, which he thus
describes : —
“ Early in April, on Fast Day, while we were going to meeting,
an alarm gun was fired from the Castle. I repaired to Long
Wharf, and manned my barge with forty men. Proceeding down,
I observed a ship and three schooners making for Shirley Point,
and immediately proceeded to Pudding Point Channel, and took
charge of piloting her through the Narrows. But Mr. Knox and
Capt. D. Martin coming on board, Knox being the branch pilot, I
gave up my command, and in a few moments he ran the ship on a
spit of sand, which I cautioned him of. We then collected all the
boats, and loaded with powder from the ship, and sent them to
town. There were then lying in Nantasket Road, the ‘ Rainbow,’
of fifty guns; ‘ Dawson,’ of fourteen; and a schooner, tender to
the ‘ Rainbow.’ They made no attempt to succor the ship during
the day; but I expected they would in the night, and warned Capt.
Mugford and the other captains to be very vigilant. I left on
board the ship a captain and two subalterns, with forty men, and
returned to my quarters. In the night, the British attempted to
retake the ship, or destroy her. They came with five boats full of
men, and the largest laid the ship alongside. Credit is due to
Daniel Malcom, who threw a rope over the boat’s mainmast, and
hauled her in till her halyards could be seized by those on board
the ship ; by which the boat was filled and sunk, and sixty men
were put to their paddles, most of whom were drowned. A heavy
fire from our soldiers obliged them to make a shameful retreat.
They fired a great number of shot at us without effect. She was
a most valuable prize, being fully loaded with military stores. We
were very short of them, and Lord North could not have done us
a greater service.”
The next day, Gen. Ward inquired whether Sargent could drive
the enemy from Nantasket. He informed him, that his cannon
were too small; but, Ward wishing him to make the experiment,
he repaired in the night to Long Island with three hundred men,
erected breastworks before light, and in the morning saluted the
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“ Rainbow” with a shot, which struck her on the quarter, carrying
away some of her upper works; and excited so great a panic in the
enemy, that they instantly towed out, and, the wind springing up,
sailed off with the utmost despatch. Sargent, satisfied with their
movements, was too prudent to betray his weakness by firing a
second time. Crowned with these victories, in July, 1776, he left
Boston for New York, with the only full regiment then formed,
numbering, officers and men, seven hundred and twenty-seven.
And, by December, he had used up this regiment, by continual
and desperate fighting, at Harlem Heights, Fort Washington,
White Plains, and by casualties; one hundred and ninety-five of
them only were left, to tell the melancholy fate of their comrades.
So ardent was Sargent’s patriotism, that, many years after the
peace, being in Boston on Sunday, he went to church with his half
brother, Daniel Sargent, Esq. and took his seat, before he per
ceived that his own brother, from Halifax, who had been a tory
and refugee, was in the same pew with him. The moment he dis
covered this, he seized his three-cornered hat, and stalked out of
church; vociferating afterwards, that the same roof should never
cover such a------ tory as his brother was, and himself. He died
1828.

Page 18.
The following description of Putnam was not intended for pub
lication; but that lends it the highest interest. Judge Dana, a
senator of the United States from Maine, was a grandson of Put
nam, and remarks in his letter, 1818, that he had just been to visit
his aunt Waldo, Gen. Putnam’s daughter; and then gives the fol
lowing description of the general: —
“ In his person, for height, about the middle size ; very erect;
thickset, muscular, and firm in every part. His countenance was
open, strong, and animated; the features of his face large, wellproportioned to each other, and to his whole frame; his teeth fair
and sound till death. His organs and senses were all exactly
fitted for a warrior ; he heard quickly, saw to an immense distance;
and, though he sometimes stammered in conversation, his voice
was remarkably heavy, strong, and commanding. Though face
tious and dispassionate in private, when animated in the heat of
battle, his countenance was tierce and terrible, and his voice like
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thunder. His whole manner was admirably calculated to inspire
his soldiers with courage and confidence, and his enemy with terror.
The faculties of his mind were not inferior to those of his body ;
his penetration was acute, his decision rapid, yet remarkably cor
rect ; and the more desperate his situation, the more collected and
undaunted. With the courage of a lion, he had a heart that
melted at the sight of distress; he could never witness suffering
in any human being, without becoming a sufferer himself; even
the operation of blood-letting has caused him to faint. In viewing
the field of battle, his distress was exquisite, until he had afforded
friend or foe all the relief in his power. Once after a battle, on
examining a bullet-wound through the head of a favorite officer,
Capt. Whiting, who died on the field, he fainted, and was taken up
for dead. Martial music roused him to the highest pitch ; while
solemn, sacred music set him into tears. In his disposition he
was open and generous, almost to a fault; he never disguised; and
in the social relations of life he was never excelled.”

Page 29.
One of the most magnificent monuments that ever bore the
name of any man, and which will transmit the name of Warren,
in grateful and glorious remembrance, down to the latest posterity,
has been erected in Boston Harbor. Fort Warren, for strength,
grandeur, and scientific perfection, is one of the masterpieces of
military art; and it will be highly gratifying to all the countrymen
of Col. Thayer, — that most amiable, scientific, and distinguished
engineer, by whom it was constructed, — that his name will be for
ever so honorably and deservedly associated with that of Warren.
Both were born in the vicinity of Boston.

Page 30.
If we may be excused for speaking from a very slight experi
ence, we should say, there is no reason to suppose that any of
Ward’s orders to his officers, on the occasion of the battle, were in
writing. In 1814, when the British forces, freed from European
service, were pouring into Canada, and apprehensions were enter
tained that they would make their way into our country, we joined
the army under Gen. Izard, on the Champlain frontier, as one of
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the Massachusetts volunteers, and served in his staff through the
campaign as topographical engineer. The general was soon ordered
to the Niagara frontier, to save Gen. Brown from Drummond’s
superior force, which we found posted on the north bank of the
Chippewa River, and with very formidable fortifications along
the southern shore likewise. Gen. Izard, finding that the enemy’s
position was unassailable in front, was desirous of discovering
whether the British fleet, with the large frigate they had been
building, which was to give them the mastery over Commodore
Chauncey, was out on Lake Ontario, so as to prevent him from
getting on the enemy’s flank or rear. To gain this information,
he ordered me, and not in writing, to go with a small detachment
of infantry across the Niagara River in a boat, and proceed to the
vicinity of Lake Ontario, to obtain the requisite information.
That region was abandoned to the enemy, and deserted by all
the Americans, excepting a few men who frequented it occasionally,
to look after their property, though their fine crops were rotting
on the ground. We embarked on the Canada side of the Niagara ;
and, as we neared the opposite shore, we were challenged by a
body of musketeers demanding who we were. Neither party had
any uniform, or other badge of nationality; and as they, being on
terra firma, had us at a great disadvantage, my tactic was to gain
time, while we were fast approaching the shore. But as I was only
a soldier “ by the book,” and very little of that, I was confounded
with my situation. Having often pondered on Maj. Andre’s egre
gious indiscretion, in disclosing to his captors who he was, in
place of claiming to be an American, which would have insured his
safety, I was disposed to avoid his mistake, and pass our party off
for English. But no simile goes on all-fours. In our case, had I
guessed wrong as to their character, they would have responded
with their guns. To gain time, I cried out, “ Friends ! ” but that
trick did not take; their muskets were levelled at us, and they
swore they would fire, if we did not answer them directly. We
were prepared for them, and I was compelled to show our colors.
1 cried out, “ Americans ! ” when they hailed us, “ Brothers ! ” to our
great delight. We soon gained the information we were in pur
suit of, and had the melancholy though magnificent view, with our
glass, of the British fleet in the offing, on Lake Ontario. We
reported these unpleasant tidings to Gen. Izard; and his whole
plan of campaign was frustrated, and the war virtually over. The

38
general, in his dilemma, consulted one of the most distinguished
officers in the army, and as great a military genius probably as the
world has produced, — young Col. M‘Cree, of the engineers. On
our arrival at Fort Erie, we found him in Gen. Brown’s staff;
and he had really been the principal staff on which Brown had
leaned to gain his brilliant success on the Niagara frontier. Gen.
Izard was desirous of reaping the same advantage from M‘Cree,
who advised to a very ingenious and scientific expedient to extri
cate the general from his embarrassment. It was to construct a
floating bridge at some distance above the enemy, on our side of
the Chippewa, with one end fastened on our side, while the rest
of the bridge was to be floated off into the river ; and the other
end, when the current had carried it to the opposite shore, to be
attached there, for our army to pass over. But Gen. Brown, once
relieved by Izard from Drummond’s superior force, seemed not at
all disposed to assist him to gain any laurels in return. There
was a marked jealousy and coldness between those officers, that
precluded any joint enterprise of theirs from succeeding.
Brig.-Gen. Totten, now head of the engineer department, was a
young engineer in Gen. Izard’s staff, and gained his first laurels
at Plattsburgh. The forts he built there would have done him
honor, even had he then gained his present high advancement.
With the most unmanageable material, the sand of Plattsburgh,
he contrived, with the aid of carpentry, to construct his forts with
a skill, science, and ingenuity that would have rendered them im
pregnable, Gen. Izard declared, against the overwhelming force of
Prevost, even if it had not been crippled by the naval victory of
the gallant Com. M‘Donough. When we left Plattsburgh for Fort
Erie, Totten remained behind to test and fight his own works,
which he did with great eclat. Winstanley, the gallant civil
engineer, who bravely dared to prove his own light-house against
as fierce an elemental strife as ever raged, fell a noble sacrifice to
an inscrutable decree of Providence; but Totten, more fortunate,
found his works were not to be subdued by man.

Page 30.
The author thinks we are mistaken as to the number of cannon
belonging to the corps of artillery at Cambridge. Our informants,
in 1818, were Col. Popkin and Capt. Trevett, captains in the
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corps; and they are so well known yet, from their high character,
and the public stations they held, that we need say no more of
their testimony. Capt. Trevett will be recollected as the distin
guished officer in the battle, and for a great number of years
commander of the revenue cutter at Boston. Col. Popkin was
born at Boston, of Welsh descent. He had been in Paddock’s
corps, was a major in Greaton’s regiment, and in the battle of
White Plains;
at Saratoga as Aid to Gen.
Lincoln; afterwards lieutenant-colonel of artillery under Crane,
and left the army at the peace a colonel. He was a custom-house
officer under Gen. Lincoln, in 1789, and remained in office till his
decease, 1827, aged eighty-four.
He w'as father of the learned,
beloved, and respected Professor John S. Popkin, of Harvard
University, for more than half a century past dear to all the friends
of that institution, and whose sermons would do honor to any man.

Page 30.

Gen. Burbeck, who was with the army at the time of the battle,
says, the following is an accurate description of Col. Prescott: —
“ Figure to yourself a man of sixty, six feet high, and somewhat
round-shouldered, sunburned from exposure, with coarse leather
shoes, and blue stockings, coarse home-spun cloth small-clothes, a
red waistcoat, and a calico banian, answering to the sack worn at
the present day, a three-cornered hat with a red cockade, and a
bandoleer, or belt, with a sword hung high up under the left arm.
You will say that it is a complete caricature; but such was the
fact, and such was the dress of the heroes who fought at the Battle
of Bunker Hill.”
“ On the day of the battle,” Burbeck says, “ Gen. Putnam rode
between Charlestown and Cambridge without a coat, in his shirt
sleeves, and an old white felt hat on, to report to Gen. Ward, and
to consult on farther operations.”*
* June 15, '75, a committee of Mass. Congress report Little’s regiment
to have eight companies, 509 men, 382 of them with bayonets, and seven of
the companies at Cambridge. Little’s orderly book is extant.
The British fired without aim, holding their guns below the shoulder, as,
by reason of the recoil, they did in our war of 1812.
We conclude, as we commenced, with expressing our belief in the inten
tional honor and honesty of the author.

